Reductio ad absurdum is

A method of proof which proceeds by stating a proposition and then showing that it results in a contradiction, thus demonstrating the proposition to be false.

See Wolfram MathWorld:
<http://mathworld.wolfram.com/ReductioadAbsurdum.html>

The validity of this method of refuting a proposition was acknowledged by the Supreme Court of Canada as early as 1914 and as recently as 2000. See Townsend v. Northern Crown Bank, 49 SCR 394 at 397-98 (“That is almost a reductio ad absurdum, and Mr. Laidlaw, of course, did not assume any such untenable position, rather he tried to escape for it.”)  and R. v. Proulx, 2000 SCC 5 at para. 53, [2000] 1 SCR 61 (used to describe an analysis leading to a “penalogical paradox”).

A CanLII search done on August 23, 2012  has the earliest reported use on its database in a 1887 Ontario Court of Appeal decision and the most recent early in 2012. One of the cases produced by that search is R. v. Renouf, 2001 NFCA 56, 160 CCC (3d) 173 where, at para. 16, the Newfoundland & Labrador Court of Appeal quoted from one its 1999 decisions: “”On their face, the above results appear to defy common sense. However, the law is replete with possibilities of “reductio ad absurdum” situations which in reality do not occur regularly and, indeed, can usually be avoided by the exercise of a modicum of care.”

But then, of course, sometimes these situations do occur regularly in law and cannot be avoided even by the exercise of the utmost care (at least by a judge).

The proposition is that the material contribution doctrine as explained by the Supreme Court of Canada in Clements v. Clements, 2012 SCC 32 is incoherent.

What you’re about to read is:

(1)  an explanation that shows why the material contribution doctrine, as described in Clements v. Clements, 2012 SCC 32, amounts to a restatement of the existing indivisible injury doctrine when applied to claims that involve multiple  tortious causes with multiple wrongdoers where the evidence is that each of those causes, by itself, would have been a but-for cause of at least some of the injury and losses alleged by plaintiff;

(2)  an explanation of why one of the two categories of situation that fall within the Clements “bright line” statement of when material contribution to risk applies – the application of the doctrine premised on the assumption that plaintiff cannot validly establish factual causation on the balance of probability so but should be allowed to prove causation regardless – is a situation where the plaintiff has established factual causation on the balance of probability against at least two or more of the tortfeasors.

Reduction ad absurdum.

So, pull up  chair, grab a tipple, and let’s begin.

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